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Abstract
The term cosmopolitanism both expresses an attitude towards our present time and pro-
vides certain keys to analyse it. This article aims to better understand the revival of cosmo-
politanism since the end of the twentieth century by confronting conceptual developments 
in the social and political theory of modernity with the historical experiences of interpreting 
and institutionalizing modernity. At the heart of the matter are views about the prevailing 
social bonds between human beings and their implication for building and maintaining 
political institutions. The common view of modernity as marked by trends towards individ-
ualization and instrumental rationalization is redefined as one interpretation of modernity 
among others; and the current situation is regarded as a struggle over world-interpretations 
rather the imposition of linear trends towards globalization and individualization, a view 
that was dominant at the same time as cosmopolitan thinking revived.
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Resumen. Las interpretaciones de la modernidad y el problema de hacer mundo 
El término cosmopolitismo expresa una actitud hacia nuestra época actual y, al mismo 
tiempo, proporciona ciertas claves para analizarla. Este artículo pretende comprender mejor 
el resurgimiento del cosmopolitismo desde finales del siglo xx mediante la confrontación 
de los desarrollos conceptuales de la teoría política y social de la modernidad con las expe-
riencias históricas de interpretación e institucionalización de la modernidad. En el centro 
de la cuestión se hallan los puntos de vista sobre los vínculos sociales que prevalecen entre 
los seres humanos y las implicaciones que estos tienen para la construcción y el sostén de las 
instituciones políticas. La idea común de la modernidad marcada por las tendencias hacia la 
individualización y la racionalización instrumental se redefine como una interpretación de 
la modernidad entre otras, y se considera la situación actual más como una lucha en torno 
a las interpretaciones mundiales que como la imposición de tendencias lineales hacia la 
globalización y la individualización, la perspectiva dominante en el momento del resurgir 
del pensamiento cosmopolita.
Palabras clave: cosmopolitismo; globalizacion; individualizacion; modernidad; racionalidad 
instrumental
The past two decades have witnessed a revival of the term cosmopolitanism in 
public and scholarly debate. Numerous of the early contributions made refe-
rences to the bicentennial and hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary, respectively, 
of the publication of two landmark writings on this matter: in 1795, Immanuel 
Kant offered reflections on the way Towards perpetual peace; and in 1848, 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels published their Manifesto of the Communist 
Party. We can understand the former as a politico-philosophical analysis of 
the conditions for orderly international relations to emerge; and the latter as 
a socio-economic analysis of what now is being called globalization, namely 
the ever wider extension of social relations potentially across the whole globe.
Clearly, the revival of debate was not motivated by celebrating anniver-
saries in intellectual history. Rather, these time-honoured writings were dug 
out because they suddenly seemed to speak to the current situation. Among 
the recent changes that triggered the interest, the fall of Soviet socialism was 
particularly significant. It brought a bipolar global constellation to an end as 
well as the related habit of speaking about three contemporary worlds – the 
First World of liberal-democratic capitalism, the Second World of existing 
socialism, and the Third World of modernization and development. In turn, 
its demise was sometimes seen as due to the dynamics of global capitalism, in 
particular in the era of digital information and communication technologies, 
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which the economic organization of Soviet socialism could not keep up with. 
In other words, the prevalent image was the one of an emerging singular world, 
united by globally extended socio-economic ties and requiring orderly rela-
tions between the existing states, which were de facto losing sovereignty due to 
increasing interdependence, but were not for that reason withering away (see 
Karagiannis and Wagner, 2007; Rosich, 2016 for detailed discussion). Let us 
call this, for reasons to be discussed later, an interpretation of modernity that 
emerged strongly from about 1990 onwards. 
Kant’s and Marx’s reflections are certainly worth going back to. But what is 
often overlooked in re-reading them is the fact that their expectations about the 
future world, from their time of writing onwards, would turn out to be quite 
wrong. After Kant, the most devastating wars human history has seen were still 
to come. After Marx had written about the dissolution of all kinds of national 
bonds, nation-states were forming in Europe with ever tighter bonds between 
their citizens and erecting well-controlled boundaries towards the outside. 
Thus, rather than re-reading these authors to see whether their expectations 
might be closer to reality this time, a profoundly a-historical enterprise, it might 
be more useful to review the history of socio-political organization since their 
time of writing in the light of the assumptions about the relations between 
human beings and about the political forms in which they live together.
This, namely, is the underlying key question. Human beings entertain 
relations of various kinds and intensity towards each other: commercial, com-
municative, associative, affective, and others. Their analysis is the task of what 
we now call social theory, and guiding questions have been whether social life 
over time changes by strengthening some kinds of social bonds and weakening 
others, and what the consequences of any such trends are. And human beings 
also live in organized collectivities that share the rules that govern their lives in 
common. The analysis of these organizations and their rules is the task of what 
we now call political theory, and guiding questions have been to understand 
which forms of political organization are sustainable over time and which ones 
satisfy normative demands, such as importantly the commitment to freedom, 
both personal and collective. At the intersection of social and political theory, 
the question arises whether political organization requires a certain specificity 
and limited extension of social bonds. Cosmopolitan reasonings, in the bro-
adest sense, tend to either deny that this is the case – all human beings can 
live well together – or suggest that our time has brought about a situation – of 
global extension of social bonds – in which these conditions of specificity and 
limitation no longer prevail.
In the following, I want to suggest that such conclusions follow easily 
neither from a conceptual nor from a historical review of socio-political chan-
ges since Kant’s and Marx’s times of writing. Following a widespread practice, 
I suggest we can analyse these two centuries with the help of the term “moder-
nity” (and will explain later why). Thus, I will briefly and schematically first 
retrieve some key elements of the social theory of modernity and subsequently 
of the political theory of modernity with a view to showing both the different 
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perspectives between them and the common underlying problématiques. To 
go beyond the divide, we need to adopt an ontology of social and political life 
that places language at its centre. Thus, we can recognize persistent variety in 
the interpretations of modernity and diagnose our present time as a struggle 
over world-interpretations in a particular context.
The social theory of modernity
The social theory of modernity emerged as a thinking about radical trans-
formations in social relations during the long European nineteenth century, 
which is seen as lasting from 1789 to 1914. Thus, we refer to a range of 
scholars reaching from Henri de Saint-Simon and G.W.F. Hegel to Alexis 
de Tocqueville and Karl Marx to Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and Georg 
Simmel. Across all differences between them, these authors had in common 
that they identified a profound rupture in social life that had brought about, or 
was to bring about, a radically new form of social relations and social structure. 
Even though they chose different terms for characterizing the rupture and the 
ensuing social transformation, and varied in the identification of the events 
that they saw as most significant for the transformation, they made the analysis 
of the emergent social formation their key concern, both because it was new 
and because it would mark the present and the future. 
Modernity, in the sum of these authors’ views, was characterized by a 
number of features that had been absent from the social world before the rup-
ture or at least only of marginal importance. Modernity brought with itself a 
novel way of being-in-the-world and novel attitudes to the world as well as to 
other human beings, which were captured by terms such as abstract freedom, 
individual instrumental rationality, individualism, and occidental rationalism. 
The novel social constellation within which human beings find themselves 
and within which these attitudes grow, in turn, is captured by terms such 
as industry, division of labour, democracy, bourgeois society, working class, 
and capitalism. Even though earlier developments are sometimes mentioned, 
all these authors claimed that these attitudes and constellations emerged, or 
arose to dominance, in Europe from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries onwards. 
The emerging dominance of instrumental rationality weakens or destroys 
all other bonds between human beings. We can look at Marx and Engels’s 
view as a particularly striking, strongly worded example. The Manifesto authors 
claim that the bourgeoisie “has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties 
that bound man to his ‘natural superiors’, and has left remaining no other 
nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash pay-
ment”. It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chi-
valrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical 
calculation.” While the adjectives “feudal”, “religious”, “chivalrous” and also 
“philistine” refer to kinds of social bonds, Marx and Engels also thematize the 
predominant form of existence of those bonds that are bound to be destroyed, 
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namely the national one. The bourgeoisie “has drawn from under the feet of 
industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national 
industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. [...] In place of 
the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in 
every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so 
also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations 
become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness 
become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local 
literatures, there arises a world literature.” 
While this overall perspective was developed up to 1920, roughly, it found 
a novel expression in post-Second World War social theory through Talcott 
Parsons’s attempt at turning these observations on transformations of the social 
bond into a theory of “modern society”. Appearances notwithstanding, Par-
sons, too, operated with the theorems of rationalization and individualization. 
He transforms the latter into a view of modern institutions as the institutio-
nalization of freedom, and the former into seeing functional differentiation 
as the problem-adequate separate realization of different forms of rationality. 
Doubting the overall coherence of the framework, Parsons’s critics returned 
to identifying trends of rationalization and individualization, aiming to assess 
tensions or harmonies between them as well as paradoxical normative conse-
quences (see, for instance, Touraine, 1993; Honneth, 2004).
For further reflection, we retain that the social theory of modernity works 
with the notion of a forceful trend in the transformation of social bonds 
towards the hegemony of an individual-instrumental attitude to others. This 
can be called a “thin” bond (Walzer, 1994, for one use of the distinction 
“thick/thin” in political philosophy). At the same time, the form of existence 
of those bonds is of little interest. The focus is on trends rather than on ins-
titutions; and where institutions matter, such as in Parsons, they are all alike 
under conditions of modernity, because they are functionally determined.
This, at least, was the state of debate until recently. Over the past two or 
three decades, however, social theory has been thrown in disarray. One of the 
starting-points was the frontal attack by Jean-François Lyotard (1979), who 
suggested that the homogenizing conceptual language of social theory was 
inadequate for a social world that was marked by a plurality of language games. 
A little later, cultural phenomena were brought to central place by suggesting 
that, globally, there was no superior model of “modern society” but “multiple 
modernities” instead (Eisenstadt, 2000) and that, domestically, existing socie-
ties were becoming increasingly multi-cultural.
The political theory of modernity
The political theory of modernity had a very different intellectual trajectory. 
Witnessing the religious wars in Europe, it was concerned with establishing the 
possibilities for domestic peace. The preferred solution discussed during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the social contract. Assuming human 
272 Papers 2015, 100/3 Peter Wagner
beings are first of all individuals, they had to get together and agree on ways of 
living together that would preserve both their lives and their liberty. The polity 
was seen as an association created by agreement – the contract – and for a 
purpose – safeguarding the life and liberty of its members. Variations notwiths-
tanding, we can say that the reasoning was individualist and instrumentalist. 
It started out from human beings as individual atoms; and it postulated that 
their actions were rational towards a purpose.
Social-contract theory was one of the intellectual inspirations of the late-
eighteenth century revolutions, and the constitutions written up after the revo-
lutions to consolidate the new order were regarded as social contracts. But in 
the aftermath of the revolutions political thinking changed, not least because 
it had to take the new political reality into account. French revolutionaries 
had sometimes stipulated that everyone who adhered to the principles of the 
republic could become a citizen of the new polity. They were addressing in an 
expansionist way an undecidable openness with regard to the boundaries of 
the republican polity. But elsewhere one recognized the expansionism through 
the Napoleonic wars, which one could see as liberating from the Old Regime 
or as imperial or as a combination of both.
Intellectually prepared before the Revolution, by authors such as Johann 
Gottfried Herder, a connection between liberalism and nationalism arose out-
side of France. The central idea was that polities should be formed by speakers 
of the same language. We may call this the cultural-linguistic theory of the 
polity. It gave an answer to the question where the boundaries of a modern 
polity should be, namely defined by the linguistic community. As to why 
this should be so, the reasoning contains different nuances. One can take the 
cultural-linguistic theory as considering the abstract liberalism as too deman-
ding: if people have nothing else in common, they will not be able to live 
together just by abiding to an instrumental agreement. They have to be known 
as sharing values, and common language is a good indicator for shared values, 
because language is world-constituting. But one can also read the approach 
more pragmatically: in the modern polity the citizens will have to communi-
cate with each other about the matters they have in common and common 
measures they might need to take. Not everything will already be contained 
in the constitutive contract. And the precondition for communication is a 
common language. If individualist instrumentalism works with a thin view of 
the social bond, the cultural-linguistic theory works with a much thicker one.
The cultural-linguistic theory of the polity put its mark on the European 
nineteenth century. It inspired movements for national unification where 
speakers of the same language lived in different polities, such as German and 
Italian speakers; and it inspired movements for national liberation where 
speakers of one language co-existed with speakers of other languages in one 
polity and when one of those languages was dominant. This was the case for 
Greek speakers in the Ottoman Empire, for various language groups in the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, and for Catalan and Basque speakers in Spain, 
among others. 
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Between the late nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, the mostly rather liberally oriented cultual-linguistic approach to poli-
ty formation turned increasingly dogmatic and aggressive in the course of 
the “nationalisation of European societies” (Noiriel, 1991), which we cannot 
analyse in detail here. Within these societies, the “national question” and the 
“social question” were considered to be the key challenges one had to address; 
and the hope was that the answer to one could be supported by the answer to 
the other. But after the First World War, the answers to the single questions 
were radicalized each on their own. With Nazism, the nation was turned into 
an existential collectivivity – just as class was in Stalinism (Heller, 1991). 
After the end of the Second World War, European polities were rebuilt by 
limiting the range of permissible political discourse. The liberal-democratic 
welfare and nation-states that emerged within Western Europe can be seen as 
combining elements of national and social responses to the key nineteenth-
century questions with the liberal-democratic commitment. This compromise 
worked rather well in numerous cases, though not in all. But at its roots was 
an unacknowledged ambiguity between the underlying organizing principles, 
covered up by the moderately well functioning of the arrangement. The main 
form of political organization remained national-territorial, whereas liberal-
democratic and social components were introduced into those containers.
Thus, in political terms, Europe has been dominated by attempts to arrange 
socio-political life in rather closed, territorially circumscribed communities in 
which speakers of the same language would live together, while being sepa-
rated from speakers of other languages with whom one would entertain only 
relations of low intensity and little significance. Such attempts have never been 
entirely coherent conceptually nor entirely successful institutionally. Never-
theless, the image of the world that was thus created has remained dominant 
until recently.
But until recently only: as our opening remarks indicated, the current 
debate on cosmopolitanism suggests that these socio-political containers are 
leaking on all sides, if they are not disintegrating entirely. Terms such as “the 
decline of the nation-state” capture descriptively the decreasing control by the 
state of phenomena, such as the economy or education, over which it used to 
have a considerable amount of control. Conceptually, furthermore, it points 
to the end of a model of political integration, by “thick”, cultural-linguistic 
means namely.
Social and political ontology
Hopefully, these accounts of the history of social and of political theory over 
the past two centuries have been plausible – despite or because of their brief 
and schematic nature. Two features should have become visible: in historical 
perspective, on the one hand, there is almost complete asynchronicity between 
the two approaches. Before the onset of modernity, the world is characterized 
by a large variety of thick social bonds, “motley feudal ties”, for social theory, 
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whereas political theory develops the individualist-instrumentalist approach 
to polity constitution, in which “thinness” of social bonds is a precondition. 
In the course of the history of modernity, social theory diagnoses unstoppable 
processes of individualization and rationalization, tearing down all walls and 
fences, whereas political theory comes up with the cultural-linguistic theory of 
the polity, which justifies strong boundaries. At the current moment, finally, 
social theory rediscovers multiplicity and strength of social bonds, whereas 
political analysis observes the strain on institutions due to individualization 
and globalization.
In conceptual terms, on the other hand, the approaches overlap at some 
points, but they tend to answer similar questions by different means. Social 
theory observes and reflects on changes in social relations, and then may draw 
conclusions from its insights for political forms, their viability and/or their 
desirability. Political theory, in turn, observes and reflects on political forms, 
and then may ask whether these forms do not have requirements with regard 
to the nature and structure of social relations among its members. Such diffe-
rence of perspective can be enriching, but the diversity of outcomes – both 
interpretation of history and conceptual reasoning – is troubling and in need 
of explanation. We cannot do so here for the whole intellectual history that we 
briefly sketched (elements can be found in Wagner, 2001; and Wagner, 2008: 
ch. 13). But we can make one observation on issues of social and political 
ontology that inform the dichotomous conceptualizations (in this section), to 
be followed by a reflection on ways of theorizing modernity that vary with the 
ontological position one takes (in the subsequent section).
Above, we have described a “thick” way of seeing language, namely as 
expressing a whole way of being. In this view, our language is indicative of, 
and a correlate to, our values, our culture, our morals, in short: to our self. This 
view is built on the insight that human beings are “self-interpreting animals” 
(Taylor, 1995, on which the following draws) and that language is consti-
tutively social. Herder, as mentioned above, is a key reference for this view. 
But this is not the only way of seeing language. The “thin” alternative sees 
language as a means of instrumental communication with others. It is a tool 
to be applied for a purpose. “To make oneself understood”, in this perspective 
does not signify “to convey who one is”, but rather “to explain what one aims 
to obtain”. 
Two very different ways of regarding the task of translation emerge from 
this distinction. In the former understanding, a translator would aim at brin-
ging out that which is specific to expressions in the particular language. In the 
latter understanding, the translator would identify the purpose of the statement 
and underline it. As an eminent social and political theorist once said to me 
in private communication, applying this latter view: “If something cannot be 
said in English, it is not worth saying at all.”
To return briefly to the preceding discussion for illustration: The “con-
tainer image” of the world had assumed that human social life could flourish 
because all significant relations could be both handled (instrumentally) and 
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expressed (creatively, affectively, …) through the dense web of significations 
provided by a common language. A world in which strong boundaries have 
disappeared, in turn, would need to operate with a “thin” universal language 
that most speakers learn as a second language and that would presumably be 
mostly used instrumentally and/or through translation across first languages 
that would shift the burden of conveying “thick” meaning onto the capacity 
for translation, whether by the actors themselves or by intermediaries.
It is not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that language is, obviously, 
both instrumental and expressive. But further questions follow. First of all, 
the two views of language do not simply co-exist; the former is contained in 
the latter. Expressing instrumentality is one way of expressing oneself. The 
instrumental use of language is thus a specific case among language’s expressive 
possibilities. 
In this light, secondly, the socio-theoretical interpretation of the history 
of European modernity signals a shift in the predominant ways of expressing 
oneself. From among a broader range of human possibilities, the instrumental 
one gains ever further dominance. This is a way of looking at social transfor-
mations as transformations in the relations between human beings as expressed 
in language use. Normatively, it can be regarded as an impoverishment or as 
an increase in functionality.
Therefore, thirdly, one can ask which use of language is adequate in which 
context. Rather than rejecting it throughout, advocates of the “thick” view of 
language will accept that instrumental use is adequate in some contexts. For 
our discussion, the question is whether an instrumental use of language is ade-
quate among the members of a polity with a view to determining the rules for 
life in common. Clearly, polities are not associations that human beings create 
or join for a purpose. They are collectivities of human beings who already live 
with each other, in some broad sense, mostly understood as sharing a territory. 
But as social-contract theorists maintain, one might not rule out that looking 
at polities as if they were associations for a purpose could bring some benefit. 
To understand that benefit, if any, we need to explicitly explore for a moment 
the question of modernity.
Rethinking modernity
Modernity is best seen as an imaginary signification of society (drawing on 
Castoriadis, 1975), and in particular as one that is built around the notions 
of autonomy and mastery. Such an imaginary was most strongly and clearly 
expressent in Enlightenment philosophy, but components and versions of it 
can be found at other times and places in human history. Importantly, there 
is one particular way of reading Enlightenment philosophy that emphasizes 
the centrality of the knowing subject, most clearly expressed in Descartes’s 
Discours de la méthode. This way lends itself to interpreting autonomy as indi-
vidual autonomy and mastery as instrumental mastery. Furthermore, this view, 
if valid, would help us understand why individualization and rationalization 
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are dominant social trends under conditions of modernity. And lastly, this 
view also suggests that a polity formed by instrumentally minded individuals 
would be the epitome of the modern polity.
Interestingly, this image of modernity has mostly been painted by strong 
advocates of the model, such as some rational choice theorists and liberal-indi-
vidualist political philosophers, and by those who strongly criticize and reject 
it, such as some scholars from post-colonial studies. Historico-sociological 
studies of the periods and places to which the term “modernity” is usually 
attached rarely found it convincing.
This representation narrows the angle from which modernity is looked at 
in rather the same way in which the instrumental view of language limits the 
view on language. The individualist-instrumental interpretation of modernity 
is one interpretation. It is a possibility within a much larger range of options. 
The imaginary signification of modernity does not provide any model for 
socio-political organization; it opens a space of interpretations within which 
debate and struggle over the most adequate interpretation at a certain place 
and time can take place.
To add some more concreteness: the general commitment to autonomy 
leaves open the precise relation between individual and collective autonomy. 
As the articulation between liberty and democracy, this question has occupied 
much of political theory over the past three hundred years. But the search for a 
theoretical answer is futile, because any of them can be contested from within 
the same frame of reasoning. Rather, human beings will need to create the 
relation between freedom and democracy within their polity in the light of 
their own history and experiences (see now Rosich and Wagner, 2016). Simi-
larly, the commitment to mastery opens up further questions. One can aim at 
mastering oneself, other human beings, or nature – three rather different issues 
to which no general maxim can be applied. Furthermore, mastery is not neces-
sarily instrumental mastery; it can be engagement with something or someone 
other that is better described as a hermeneutical relation, as understanding. 
In other words, the history of modernity cannot be written as the history 
of the increase of individual autonomy and of instrumental mastery, up to the 
end-point of completing the “project of modernity”. Rather, the history of 
modernity should be written as the history of the struggle over the adequate 
interpretation of modernity at one’s own moment in space and time and in 
the light of one’s experiences (Wagner, 2008, for more detail).
The current condition of modernity
This brings us back to the beginning and our observations on current cosmo-
politanism. What is the current moment of modernity? What are our expe-
riences with modernity up to this moment? What is the struggle over the 
interpretation of modernity today about, if there is any struggle?
Full answers to these questions are not at hand, but it is useful to look 
at the current situation in the light of the “container image” of the world 
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as a representation of the “organized modernity” (Wagner, 1994) that had 
been built over the twentieth century. Recent debates, that is, debates of the 
1990s, the moment of cosmopolitanism but also the moment of neo-libera-
lism, reflect the experiences with organized modernity as a constraint. Briefly, 
an alternative image emerged with roughly the following contours: Drawing 
on the sociological theorem of globalization and individualization, in a first 
step, much political discourse suggested that there is (and: should be) little, 
or nothing, between the individual human being and the globe. Every social 
phenomenon that stands in-between tends to be considered as having freedom-
limiting effects. Significantly, the notion of democracy, which presupposes a 
specific decision-making collectivity and thus appears to stand necessarily in 
an intermediate position between the individual and the globe, tends to be 
redefined. Rather than referring to a concrete, historically given collectivity, 
processes of self-determination are, on the one side, related to social move-
ments without institutional reference, and on the other side, projected to the 
global level as the coming cosmopolitan democracy. We can characterize this 
conceptual tendency as the erasure of space (for more detail on this reasoning, 
see Wagner, 2015a).
In a second step, we can identify a similar tendency towards the erasure 
of time. The individual human beings in question are seen as free and equal, 
in particular as equally free. Thus, their life-histories and experiences are no 
longer seen as giving them a particular position in the world from which they 
speak and act. In politico-theoretical terms, this view was most strongly defen-
ded by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice (1971), which is widely considered 
as the most influential treatise in political theory of the last half century. Rawls 
suggested that we hypothesize an “original position” in which human beings 
meet to determine the rules for their life in common, and that they act under 
a “veil of ignorance”, ignoring all specific features of themselves and the others 
beyond being participants in this deliberation (for a recent critique, among 
many, see Mills, 2011). Reviving the tradition of social-contract theory, Rawls 
concomitantly returned to seeing societies as associations of individuals for a 
common purpose, neglecting the fact that human beings do not originally 
associate but always already live together with determinate others in determi-
nate space and time.
But now we have moved beyond that moment. The undesirability and 
unsustainability of the space- and time-erasing image has widely been recog-
nized. In very general terms, therefore, the reconstitution of meaningful tem-
porality and spatiality is the core of the current struggle over re-interpreting 
modernity. The current work at re-interpretation takes place in the context of 
some common experience, because the degree of interconnectedness on the 
globe is today higher than in earlier periods (see Osterhammel, 2008, for an 
extended argument on this issue). Broadly, this is the experience of the dis-
mantling of existing institutions and commitments of organized modernity 
without clear and concise guidance for their rebuilding. More specifically, in 
the face of the experience of attempted erasure of temporal and spatial signi-
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ficance, the current re-interpretation encounters the need for a high degree of 
justification for any spatio-temporally specific collective commitments.
But, as in earlier periods, socio-political situations today also vary consi-
derably between regions. Varieties of organized modernity could have very 
different features. In South Africa, for instance, the constitutive feature of 
apartheid was the exclusion and oppression of the majority of the population. 
The reconstitution of modernity, thus, emphasizes equal freedom and equal 
rights as well as the reduction of social inequality. In the formerly socialist 
countries, in contrast, oppression often entailed the homogenization and stan-
dardization of life perspectives under conditions of limited social inequality; 
the emphasis for reconstitution, thus, is often on individual autonomy. The 
majority of the population of the so-called developing countries benefitted 
little from the exploitation of the earth’s resources that was driven by the early 
industrialized countries. Today, thus, those benefits are claimed, while the 
earlier instrumental mastery of nature has led to ecological risks that need to 
be urgently addressed. In all these cases, finally, a reinterpretation of moder-
nity will need to address the impact in the present of injustice committed in 
the past – the specific injustice of the past in different world-regions (see the 
contributions to Wagner, 2015b).
An analysis of the current world situation in terms of a modernity that is 
subject to a variety of possible interpretations permits overcoming the dicho-
tomy between the images of closed containers rich with meaning, on the one 
hand, and an unbounded world dominated by thin instrumentality, on the 
other. The adoption of such a view, in turn, requires focusing on the issues that 
are at stake in the translation from one interpretation of modernity to another, 
most significantly the capacity to collectively embark on processes of world-
making rather than being overrun by an allegedly self-propelled globalization. 
Given both the broadly common background in the withering away of markers 
of time and space and the different experiences with historically constituted 
forms of modernity, the creation of a singular world – be it cosmopolitan or 
neo-liberal or both – should not be expected, but a variety of world-making 
projects that will be in communication with each other without losing their 
specificities.
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